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Abstract As an institution, the American news media have become highly
unpopular in recent decades. Yet, we do not thoroughly understand the conse-
quences of this unpopularity for mass political behavior. While several existing
studies ﬁnd that media trust moderates media effects, they do not examine the
consequences of this for voting. This paper explores those consequences by ana-
lyzing voting behavior in the 2004 presidential election. It ﬁnds, consistent with
most theories of persuasion and with studies of media effects in other contexts, that
media distrust leads voters to discount campaign news and increasingly rely on their
partisan predispositions as cues. This suggests that increasing aggregate levels of
media distrust are an important source of greater partisan voting.
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Introduction
The news media play a central role in modern democracies. Citizens rely on the
media for information about politicians’ proposals and actions. As Lippmann (1997
[1922], p. 53) puts it,
Each of us lives and works on a small part of the earth’s surface, moves in a
small circle, and of these acquaintances knows only a few intimately. Of any
public event that has wide effects we see at best only a phase and an
aspect…Inevitably our opinions cover a bigger space, a longer reach of time, a
greater number of things, than we can directly observe. They have, therefore,
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DOI 10.1007/s11109-010-9123-zto be pieced together out of what others have reported and what we can
imagine.
While earlier research was more skeptical, political science scholarship
increasingly agrees that the news media play a central role on democratic
governance by, among other things, shaping public opinion and electoral
preferences (Cook 1998; Kinder 2003).
Yet at the same time, journalists and academics have become concerned about
the intense hostility the public expresses toward the news media. In the 1970s and
1980s, commentators often noted the news media’s popularity, which frequently
surpassed that of other societal institutions (Gronke and Cook 2007). However, by
the 1990s and into the twenty-ﬁrst century, many noticed that the press had become
much less popular. For instance, Fallows (1996, p. 1) opens his book assessing the
state of political journalism by saying:
Americans have never been truly fond of their press. Through the last decade,
however, their disdain for the media establishment has reached new levels.
Americans believe that the news media have become too arrogant, cynical,
scandal-minded, and destructive. Public hostility shows up in opinion polls,
through comments on talk shows, in waning support for news organizations in
their showdowns with government ofﬁcials, and in many other ways.
Sanford (1999, p. 11), a ﬁrst amendment lawyer, expresses similar concerns,
stating:
A canyon of disbelief and distrust has developed between the public and the
news media. Deep, complex and so contradictory as to be airless at times, this
gorge has widened at an accelerating rate during the last decade. Its darkness
frightens the media. It threatens not just the communication industry’s
enviable ﬁnancial power but its special role in ordering American democracy.
It is a canyon of terrifying proportions.
One way to track public opinion toward the news media over time is with the
General Social Survey’s (GSS) question battery probing conﬁdence in American
institutions, which has been part of every GSS survey since 1973. Figure 1 presents
conﬁdence in the press in GSS surveys from 1973 to 2008 compared to average
conﬁdence in all other institutions in the battery.
1 While in the 1970s conﬁdence in
the press was slightly higher than average conﬁdence, by the 1990s and 2000s,
conﬁdence in the press had declined precipitously (see also Cook and Gronke 2001;
Gronke and Cook 2007).
This change was widespread. While Republicans have modestly lower press
conﬁdence than Democrats in almost every GSS survey, that gap is dwarfed by the
secular decline found in each party as well as among independents (Gronke and
1 Television is excluded from the average in order to provide a clear comparison between the press and
other institutions that are unlikely to be considered part of the news media.
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conﬁdence in most other institutions.
2
These dramatic changes in opinions toward the news media have led some to
wonder about the consequences. Do these opinions affect the way people use the
media to acquire information and form electoral preferences? Yet while existing
studies examine how media trust moderates several types of media effects, none
look explicitly at the consequences for voter decision-making.
That is the focus of this paper. The next three sections review relevant
scholarship on partisan voting, news media persuasion, and the role of source
credibility. The subsequent section lays out my expectations for how attitudes
toward the media inﬂuence voter decision-making, speciﬁcally focusing on the role
of partisan predispositions. This is followed by sections outlining the empirical
analysis, interpreting the results, and brieﬂy concluding. The paper ends with a brief
concluding section.
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Fig. 1 Conﬁdence in the Press Declines from 1973 to 2008. Source: GSS surveys conducted in 1973,
1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994,
1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008. Note: Observations are weighted to account for the
unequal probability of inclusion in the sample resulting from variation in the number of adults in each
household, and from the GSS’s procedures for subsampling of initial nonrespondents in the 2004–2008
surveys, using the ‘‘wtssall’’ weighting variable. For details, see Appendix A of the GSS 1972-2008
Codebook. Responses are coded so that 1 indicates ‘‘a great deal,’’ 0.5 indicates ‘‘only some,’’ and 0
indicates ‘‘hardly any’’ conﬁdence. All institutions where conﬁdence was probed in every GSS survey
from 1973 to 2008, other than the press and television, are included in the ‘‘all other institutions’’
calculation. These are: major companies, organized religion, education, the executive branch, organized
labor, medicine, the Supreme Court, the scientiﬁc community, Congress, and the military. Results are
very similar if one uses the ﬁrst principle component, rather than the mean, to summarize conﬁdence
levels in all other institutions
2 While not the focus of this paper, there is also a substantial literature examining the causes of these
negative attitudes toward the news media (see for instance Christen et al. 2002; Fallows 1996; Giner-
Sorolla and Chaiken 1993; Ladd 2010; Patterson 1993; Sabato 2000; Vallone et al. 1985).
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Few political phenomena have been studied more extensively than vote choice.
While a deﬁnitive model of the voting process is still elusive, one robust empirical
regularity is that voters have strong psychological orientations toward the major
parties. These orientations serve as powerful baselines for voting decisions (Bartels
2000; Campbell et al. 1980 [1960]; Green et al. 2002; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008;
Miller and Shanks 1996). One consequence is that, in circumstances where a voter
faces a new or unfamiliar decision, she can use her party identiﬁcation (or ‘‘standing
decision’’) as a shortcut (Conover and Feldman 1989; Key and Munger 1970,p .
253; Rahn 1993). A second consequence is that, while new information can change
a voter’s party identiﬁcation, the effect is small unless the message is very dramatic
or long lasting. The short-term exogeneity of party identiﬁcation allows researchers
to be reasonably conﬁdent in their estimates of its effects (Campbell et al. 1980
[1960], pp. 531–535; Cowden and McDermott 2000; Gerber and Green 1998; Green
et al. 2002; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Johnston 2006; Miller 1999).
In contrast, attempts to estimate the effects of election-speciﬁc considerations
on voting have been more difﬁcult (Ansolabehere 2006; Bartels 1992; Holbrook
1994). The main obstacle is endogeneity. Reported perceptions of economic
performance and candidates’ personal characteristics or issue positions are as
likely to be rationalizations as causes of vote choice (Achen and Bartels 2006;
Bartels 2002; Brody and Page 1972; Kramer 1983; Lenz 2009; Page and Brody
1972; Rahn et al. 1994). Even studies showing an increase in the correlation
between speciﬁc survey responses and vote choice over the course of a campaign
are vulnerable to the worry that the campaign merely increases the amount of
rationalization (Lenz 2009).
3 Yet despite these challenges, several studies with
creative research designs have documented outside the laboratory powerful media
effects on voting.
Media Inﬂuence on Public Opinion and Voting
While some previous scholars doubted their power (e.g. Klapper 1960), in recent
decades a consensus has developed that media inﬂuence over public opinion is more
‘‘massive’’ than ‘‘minimal’’ (Kinder 1998, 2003; Zaller 1996). This literature
documents several different types of media effects on attitudes. These include
priming (e.g. Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Krosnick and Kinder 1990), framing (e.g.
Nelson et al. 1997), providing politically relevant information about national
conditions (e.g. Gilens 1999; Hetherington 1996), and direct persuasion (e.g. Bartels
1993; DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Gerber et al. forthcoming; Kahn and Kenney
2002; Ladd and Lenz 2009).
3 Some studies have had more success demonstrating economic effects on vote choice by pooling survey
data over many years and using objective measures of economic performance rather than survey
responses (Markus 1992; Zaller 2004). Unfortunately, questions probing attitudes toward the news media
have not been asked over a sufﬁciently long time period to incorporate them into this type of analysis.
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instance, Hetherington (1996) shows that those who follow the news during a
presidential campaign have different perceptions of national economic performance
and consequently different voting preferences. Bartels (1993) ﬁnds that those who
consume more news are more likely to change their views of the candidates during a
presidential campaign. Kahn and Kenney (2002) ﬁnd that newspaper editorial
endorsements are associated with evaluations of Senate candidates. Using quasi-
experimental designs, DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) and Ladd and Lenz (2009)
ﬁnd evidence that the Fox News Channel in the United States and several
newspapers in Great Britain, respectively, inﬂuence voting decisions. In a ﬁeld
experiment, Gerber et al. (forthcoming) ﬁnd evidence that newspaper exposure
inﬂuences gubernatorial votes. In summary, a few recent studies outside the
laboratory provide some evidence that media messages affect voting preferences
through providing political information and direct persuasion, although creative
research designs or unusual historical circumstances are necessary to attain that
evidence.
The Role of Source Credibility in Attitude-Change
While one stream of research documents the effects of the news media on the
public, the more general literature on attitude-change emphasizes the central role of
source credibility (Druckman and Lupia 2000). This is consistent across several
major research traditions. For instance, early work by Hovland and his colleagues
on the persuasive effects of communication argued that attitude-change depends on
perceptions of the sender’s expertise, trustworthiness and similarity to the recipient
(Hovland et al. 1953; Hovland and Weiss 1951–1952). Also, in the receive–accept-
sample model conceived by McGuire (1969) and adapted to political science by
Zaller (1992), source credibility is relevant at the acceptance stage. Perceiving the
message as coming from a source with a different predisposition induces ‘‘partisan
resistance’’ (Zaller 1992, p. 121).
In psychology, ‘‘dual-process’’ theories such as the elaboration-likelihood model
(Petty and Cacioppo 1986) and heuristic–systematic model (Chaiken 1980; Eagly
and Chaiken 1993) see source credibility as a heuristic individuals use to decide
whether to accept an argument when they lack the desire or ability to analyze the
message’s content. Zaller (1992) argues persuasively that, in modern American
politics, the vast majority of the population processes political information by the
heuristic route, where source credibility is central. Most people are neither involved
nor interested in politics by the standards of Chaiken and Petty and Cacioppo’s
experiments (Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Kinder 1998), leading
them to depend on source cues.
4
Game theoretic models of strategic communication (called in some incarnations
‘‘cheap talk’’ or ‘‘signaling’’ models), while varying in their speciﬁcations, almost
4 For more on the role of source credibility in psychological research, see O’Keefe (2002, Chap. 8) and
Perloff (2003, Chap. 6).
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inﬂuenced by informative messages (e.g. Crawford and Sobel 1982; Gilligan and
Krehbiel 1987, 1989; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). The key source criteria in these
models are whether the source is knowledgeable and has the same interests as the
message recipient. Studies where people use cues from elites as information
shortcuts when forming their opinions are of a similar intellectual lineage and posit
similar source credibility criteria (e.g. Lupia 1994; Popkin 1991; Sniderman et al.
1991). In summary, while scholars in communication, political science, psychology
and economics have active research interests in attitude-change and have developed
several distinct models of the process, almost all agree that inﬂuence depends on the
recipient’s perception of the messenger.
Several studies have speciﬁcally tested the role of source credibility in media
effects, ﬁnding that it serves as an important moderator. Miller and Krosnick (2000)
ﬁnd, in a laboratory experiment, that newspaper priming does not occur among
those who distrust the media. In another laboratory experiment, Druckman (2001)
ﬁnds that newspapers that subjects distrust do not produce framing effects. In
several observational studies, Tsfati (2002) ﬁnds that those who distrust the media
are more resistant to agenda-setting. Elsewhere, Tsfati (2003) examines people’s
beliefs about others’ opinions, ﬁnding that those who trust the media are more likely
to accept media messages about the national division of public opinion. Ladd (2004)
ﬁnds, looking at cross-sectional and panel data, that those who distrust the media are
less responsive to objective statistics when forming their beliefs about national
conditions in a variety of policy areas, instead basing their beliefs on partisanship.
Finally, in a laboratory experiment, Ladd (2004) ﬁnds that those who distrust the
media do not update their beliefs about foreign conﬂicts in response to news reports.
Taken as a whole, there are both strong theoretical reasons to believe that attitudes
toward the news media will moderate media effects and a growing number of
empirical studies indicating that they do. This paper extends this work by looking at
the consequences of media trust’s moderating role in media effects for voting
behavior.
Hypothesis
Some previous work on media source credibility has focused on the credibility of
speciﬁc outlets (Druckman 2001), while some has focused on views toward the
media in general (Ladd 2004; Miller and Krosnick 2000; Tsfati 2002, 2003).
Attitudes toward the news media as an institution are of special relevance because
they have changed so dramatically over the past 40 years. The attitude-change
literature does argue that views toward entire institutions can be consequential. For
instance, Petty and Cacioppo (1981, p. 61) state that, in the literature on source
credibility,
[t]he originator or source of a persuasive communication may be a person
(e.g., the president of the United States), a group (e.g., your family), an
institution (e.g., Stanford University), and so forth. (italics in original)
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argue that the news media function as their own political institution. Still, one
could worry that people may not have clearly held attitudes toward the media as
an institution, but only toward speciﬁc outlets. A second (related) worry is that,
even if respondents have clear opinions about the news media as a societal
institution, the various wordings used by different survey organizations may
tap different considerations and consequently produce notably different
responses.
Fortunately, studies validating these questions tend to allay both concerns.
Refusal and ‘‘don’t know’’ rates for questions about the media as an institution
tend to be unusually low: consistently less than one percent and often nearly zero
across different surveys (Tsfati 2002, p. 67). Also, responses to these questions
tend to be very consistent across wordings (Kohring and Matthes 2007; Ladd
2006a, pp. 26–28), including prominent wordings like the American National
Election Study’s (ANES) media ‘‘trust’’ and ‘‘thermometer’’ questions and the
GSS’s press ‘‘conﬁdence’’ question. These attitudes are also stable over time,
even when question wordings change in different waves of panel surveys (Ladd
2006a, pp. 28–29; Tsfati 2002, pp. 62–66).
In addition, open-ended questions about the media as an institution tend both to
prompt similar responses as closed-ended questions and to also produce consistent
responses across wordings (Ladd 2006c; Tsfati 2002, pp. 46–49). Finally, tests of
discriminate validity ﬁnd that attitudes toward the institutional news media are
distinct from general mistrust, political ideology, and ideological extremism (Tsfati
2002, pp. 50–55). All this suggests that most people have a clear attitude toward the
news media as an institution (not a ‘‘nonattitude’’; Converse 1964), and that most
prominent question wordings tap into that attitude. Tsfati (2002, p. 38) makes this
point by concluding that ‘‘people have some mental schema for what ‘the media’
are,’’ and that ‘‘[m]edia skepticism is targeted toward the mainstream media in
general.’’
Given that most people have relatively ﬁrmly held attitudes toward the media,
and the increasingly well-documented role of source credibility in media effects,
it is natural to suspect that these attitudes may have important consequences for
voters’ decision-making. As noted above, in the absence of additional consid-
erations, voters tend to fall back on their party identiﬁcation as a baseline for
making choices. With more resistance to information about national conditions
and other inﬂuential campaign news media messages, we might expect those
with negative attitudes toward the media to rely more on this baseline. Stated
simply, I expect voters who distrust the media to rely more on their party
identiﬁcation to make voting decisions.
5 The remainder of this paper tests this
prediction and interprets the results.
5 This prediction can also be derived from a simple Bayesian decision-theoretic voting model (e.g. Achen
1992). Such a model is presented in Ladd (2006b).
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I employ data from the 2000–2004 ANES panel survey.
6 As I discuss in the next
section, one advantage of these data is that the panel component offers a better
opportunity to address endogeneity concerns. As the previous section explained, I
expect the role of source credibility in media effects to produce a negative
relationship between media trust and partisan voting. To test this, Table 1 presents
results from models where the dependent variable is coded as 1 if respondents voted
for the candidate of the party they identify with and 0 otherwise. Independents that
do not lean toward one of the major parties are excluded from the analysis, as are
minor party voters and nonvoters. The primary explanatory variable is voters’
ratings of the news media on a feeling thermometer.
To ensure that the observed relationship between media trust and partisan voting
is not spurious, I attempt to hold constant other variables that may lead to more
partisan voting. To this end, I control for strength of party identiﬁcation and two
other variables that the literature consistently ﬁnds to be associated with stronger
partisanship: age (e.g. Campbell et al. 1980 [1960], pp. 162–163; Converse 1969)
and political knowledge (e.g. Zaller 1992).
7 In addition, to guard against the
possibility that differences in exposure to campaign information are driving the
apparent effects of media evaluations, I control for respondents’ frequency of
following government and public affairs, their frequency of political discussion, and
whether they viewed campaign television programming. I also control speciﬁcally
for network news exposure and newspaper exposure. However, these questions are
excluded from some models because they were not asked in 2004.
I also include several variables to ensure that media distrust is not a proxy for
general disillusionment with society or the political system. I control for
respondents’ general level of trust, calculated by averaging the ANES’s trust in
government and trust in people questions. To account for respondents’ efﬁcacy, I
control for the average of their responses to the ANES’s internal and external
efﬁcacy questions.
Finally, I attempt to ensure that any apparent effect of media evaluations is not
driven by respondents’ ideology. One way to do this is to control for respondents’
6 In 2000, the ANES used a split-mode design, with approximately half of respondents sampled by
random digit dialing and interviewed by phone, and the other half selected by probability area sampling
and interviewed in person. Reinterviews in 2002 and 2004 were conducted entirely by telephone. The
American Association for Public Opinion Research’s ofﬁcial ‘‘RR1’’ response rate for the 2000 ANES is
61% (1,807 interviews out of a sample of 2,984). Of those 1,807 respondents, 1,187 were interviewed
again in 2002 (a reinterview rate of 66%), with 840 of those interviewed again in 2004 (a reinterview rate
of 71%). As this paper focuses on responses from 2002 and 2004, the relevant response rate corresponds
to those who completed the entire panel. The RR1 response rate for the entire panel is 28% (840 out of an
initial sample of 2,984). Panel data like these have the disadvantage of possibly introducing biases
resulting from panel conditioning or panel attrition. While not settling the matter, existing scholarship is
reassuring on this point, ﬁnding panel effects in the ANES to be small (Bartels 1999).
7 Unlike many other ANES surveys, a short quiz of basic political facts is not included in the 2002 and
2004 waves of this panel survey. Instead, I measure knowledge with interviewer ratings of the
respondents’ ‘‘general level of information about politics and public affairs.’’ Interviewer ratings are often
used as substitutes when factual questions are not available (e.g. Bartels 1996) because they tend to be
highly correlated (Zaller 1985).
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123self-placements on a seven-point ideology scale. However, as with newspaper and
network news exposure, this variable cannot be included in every model because it
was not asked in 2004. Another potential problem with self-reported ideology is that
researchers often ﬁnd it to be only loosely correlated with policy preferences (e.g.
Erikson et al. 2002, pp. 205, 222–230; Stimson 2004, pp. 84–95). For this reason, I
include several more speciﬁc ideological questions. To account for economic views,
I control for respondents’ preferences on government aid to the poor. To account for
social ideology, I include thermometer ratings of ‘‘feminists.’’ To account for racial
ideology, I include thermometer ratings of ‘‘blacks.’’ Lastly, to account for defense-
related ideology, I control for government defense spending preferences.
Results
Main Results
Column 1 of Table 1 presents parameter estimates from a logit model where all
variables are measured in 2004. As expected, the coefﬁcient on media evaluations is
negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
8 Since the sizes of logit coefﬁcients are not
directly interpretable, I calculate the marginal effect of media evaluations when all
other variables are at their means. In the model in column 1, moving from a media
thermometer rating of zero to a rating of 100 decreases the probability of voting for
the candidate of one’s own party by 0.13 (Std. Err. = 0.05, p = 0.01).
However, models with cross-sectional data face the worry that causation runs in
the opposite direction. Of speciﬁc concern here is the possibility that those who
have already decided to cast partisan votes before the campaign are more likely to
react negatively to campaign coverage, leading to disproportionate declines in their
media trust. The psychological literature on the causes of media distrust lends
credence to this possibility. A prominent ﬁnding in this literature is the ‘‘hostile
media phenomenon’’ (or ‘‘hostile media effect’’): the tendency of people with
divergent prior opinions, when consuming the exact same news report, all to view
the report as biased against their views (Christen et al. 2002; Giner-Sorolla and
Chaiken 1993; Vallone et al. 1985). Given that those most predisposed toward
partisan voting before the election are likely to have more extreme political
preferences, election coverage may reduce their media trust through the hostile
media phenomenon, producing a spurious association. While not eliminating all
concerns about causal direction, measuring media evaluations several years before
the election can reduce worries that reactions to campaign coverage drive this
association.
8 The negative association between media evaluations and partisan voting is present in a simple bivariate
analysis as well. For instance, party voting occurs among 83.6% of those who rate the media at 70 degrees
or higher and among 88.5% of those who rate the media at 30 degrees or lower, a difference of
approximately 5 percentage points. This difference without controls has a p-value of 0.086. The inclusion
of control variables somewhat increases the magnitude of the relationship, reducing the p-value.
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questions as in column 1, but using responses from the 2002 wave of the panel.
9
Measuring variables in 2002 allows me to also include ideological self-placement,
network news exposure, and newspaper exposure, which were not asked in 2004.
Column 3 presents a model that includes these as additional controls. Columns 2
and 3 indicate that measuring explanatory variables 2 years prior and including
additional controls has little effect on the main ﬁnding. Column 2’s results imply
that moving from a media thermometer rating of zero to a rating of 100 (with other
variables set to their means) decreases the probability of voting for the candidate of
one’s own party by 0.20 (Std. Err. = 0.08, p = 0.01). Column 3’s results also
indicate that the same change decreases the probability of a partisan vote by 0.20
(Std. Err. = 0.08, p = 0.01), meaning that (after rounding) the inclusion of
ideological self-placement and network news and newspaper exposure does not alter
the estimated effect of media evaluations at all.
As another alternative speciﬁcation, the model in column 5 of Table 1 measures
explanatory variables in 2004 while instrumenting them with their values in 2002.
10
This model produces a statistically signiﬁcant, negative, yet less precise estimate of
the effect. The results imply that moving from a 0 to a 100 media rating decreases
the probability of a partisan vote by approximately 0.69, yet the 95% conﬁdence
interval on this effect ranges from -0.03 to an impossible -1.35. Thus, while the
estimated effect is large and negative, we should be cautious in interpreting it as
larger than the estimates from the column 1–3 equations.
11
The results from columns 2, 3, and 5 provide some reassurance that the negative
relationship between media trust and partisan voting is not a product of endogeneity
driven by the hostile media phenomenon. Admittedly, it is still possible that, prior to
2002, the hostile media phenomenon caused those who would cast more partisan
votes in 2004 to disproportionately distrust the media. Yet, at least in the 2 years
prior to the election, this type of endogeneity is not driving this relationship.
Postestimation diagnostics on these models are generally encouraging. Despite
the inclusion of numerous control variables, multicolinearity does not appear to be
severe problem. For instance, the variance inﬂation factors associated with media
thermometer ratings in the models in columns 1, 2, and 3 are only 1.25, 1.18, and
1.19, respectively. This suggests that the control variables only minimally increase
the sampling variances of the media thermometer coefﬁcients. In addition, while the
pseudo R
2 statistics for these models are low, as they tend to be for all models using
9 Measuring all explanatory variables several years prior to the election has the disadvantage of
introducing more measurement error (i.e. random variation) into these variables, potentially reducing the
model ﬁt and increasing the standard errors. This is evident in the fact that these models ﬁt the data more
poorly, with pseudo R
2s of 0.15 rather than 0.24. This becomes a more serious problem if one tries to
measure explanatory variables in 2000, four years prior to the election. This, plus the smaller sample size
(less than 450), makes it impractical to use this approach. When such a model is estimated, the pseudo R
2
drops to 0.13, and the effect of media thermometer ratings is still negative but statistically insigniﬁcant.
10 As the model in column 5 uses instrumental variables regression, it should be interpreted as a linear
probability model (Aldrich and Nelson 1984), whose coefﬁcients are not directly comparable in size to
logit coefﬁcients.
11 For the models in columns 1, 2 and 3, the 95% conﬁdence intervals on the marginal effects are 0.03–
0.23, 0.05–0.36, and 0.05–0.35, respectively.
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123political survey questions, the inclusion of media ratings modestly increases these
statistics. It increases the pseudo R
2 from 0.230 to 0.243 in column 1, from 0.132 to
0.146 in column 2, and from 0.133 to 0.147 in column 3.
Additional Robustness Checks
Another alternative explanation for these results is that negative media attitudes
induce partisan voting, not by causing resistance to the messages people receive, but
by changing those individuals’ patterns of media exposure. For example, those who
distrust the media as an institution may utilize mainstream news sources (like
network television and newspapers) less often, instead either consuming less overall
news or relying more on partisan media sources. However, the available evidence
suggests that this is not producing the entire effect observed here. Column 4 in
Table 1 shows a model that is similar to column 3, except that it includes the
interactions of media thermometer ratings with network news exposure and with
newspaper exposure. If the effect of media ratings on partisan voting occurs entirely
through changes in mainstream media exposure, these two interaction terms should
have negative coefﬁcients and the ‘‘main effect’’ of media ratings should be close to
zero. This is not what I ﬁnd. The coefﬁcients on these interaction terms are small
and statistically insigniﬁcant, while the ‘‘main effect’’ of media ratings is negative
and almost the same size as in columns 1–3.
12
However, we should draw this conclusion cautiously because adding two
interaction terms substantially increases multicolinearity. In column 4, the variance
inﬂation factor for media thermometer ratings is 4.49, indicating that the control
variables substantially increase its coefﬁcient’s sampling variance (i.e. standard
error). This larger standard error drops the coefﬁcient below standard levels of
statistical signiﬁcance.
To ensure that Table 1’s results are not unique to this dataset, I looked for the
same patterns in other datasets containing similar questions. As noted above, every
GSS survey since 1973 has probed conﬁdence in the press. Those conducted after a
presidential election also probed respondents’ vote choices. These cross-sectional
surveys reveal the same pattern of statistically signiﬁcantly greater partisan
presidential voting among those with less press conﬁdence. The ANES began asking
about media trust in its regular cross-sectional surveys in 1996. My analysis of the
1996 and 2000 surveys also indicates that partisan presidential votes are
signiﬁcantly more likely among those who distrust the media. Several respondents
in the 1996 ANES survey were also interviewed for the 1993 ANES pilot study,
where they were asked whether ‘‘[m]edia coverage of politics often reﬂects the
media’s own biases more than facts.’’ This allows for a partial replication of the
panel analysis presented in Table 1, but with a sample size of less than 350. The
results show that, when media evaluations are measured in 1993, even with the
small sample size, those with negative attitudes toward the media are signiﬁcantly
more likely to cast a partisan presidential vote in 1996. To save space and avoid
12 I also checked for interactions between media evaluations and several other variables, including
political knowledge and strength of partisanship, but found no evidence of heterogeneity in the effect.
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123redundancy, I do not report these results here, but they are all available in Ladd
(2006b).
It is also possible to test my expectations with an alternative statistical
speciﬁcation. One could estimate a model where vote choice (Republican vs.
Democratic vote) is a function of party identiﬁcation, trust in the media, the
interaction between these two variables, and control variables. Results from such a
model (using either the 2002–2004 ANES data or any of the additional datasets
described in the previous paragraph) are consistent with the results presented here.
In each dataset, the interaction term’s coefﬁcient is negative, indicating party
identiﬁcation is more inﬂuential when respondents distrust the media. These results
are also presented in Ladd (2006b).
Finally, given that Republicans have consistently more negative attitudes toward
the media, I checked whether the effect differed between Democrats and
Republicans. When the models in Table 1 are estimated separately among
Democrats and Republicans, the effect of media ratings is consistently negative
in both parties, but often not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels in the
separate partisan groups because of small sample sizes. The difference in the
magnitude of the negative effect between the parties varies considerably across
models and depending on when party identiﬁcation is measured. For instance, if one
estimates the logit model from column 3 of Table 1 separated by 2002 partisanship,
the coefﬁcient on media evaluations is -1.32 (standard error = 1.23, n = 251)
among Democrats and -1.31 (standard error = 1.41, n = 284) among Republicans.
However, if they are separated by partisanship in 2004, the coefﬁcient is -1.09
(standard error = 1.14, n = 258) among Democrats and -2.27 (standard
error = 1.22, n = 283) among Republicans, in each case an insigniﬁcant partisan
difference. Similar variation in the difference between parties occurs when control
variables are included or excluded. I conclude from this analysis that it is possible
that the affect varies across parties to some degree, a difference that could be
revealed in future studies using larger panel datasets. However, based on the
evidence available here, I cannot be certain of any partisan difference.
In summary, consistent with expectations, those with negative attitudes toward
the news media are more likely to rely on their partisanship to make presidential
voting decisions. This effect is robust to measuring the explanatory variables several
years prior to the campaign, at least partially easing concerns about endogeneity
resulting from the hostile media phenomenon. The relationship is also consistent
across different datasets and statistical speciﬁcations. Finally, the available evidence
does not reveal any consistent difference in this effect across partisan groups.
Conclusion
While a growing body of research documents the role of news media evaluations in
moderating the effect of media messages on the public’s beliefs and preferences
(Druckman 2001;L a d d2004; Miller and Krosnick 1996; Tsfati 2002, 2003),
scholars have not yet examined the consequences of this phenomenon for voting.
This paper investigates the effect of voters’ attitudes toward the news media as an
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123institution on how they form electoral preferences. Given the previous literature, I
predict that partisan voting will be greater among those who distrust the media. An
analysis of 2004 presidential voting is consistent with this prediction, even when
explanatory variables are measured several years prior to the election.
This article began by noting that, in modern democracies, voters are called upon
to make important and (at times) complicated decisions without all possible
information (Lippmann 1997 [1922]). As Conover and Feldman (1989, p. 917) put
it, ‘‘[W]hen faced with difﬁcult conditions created by an ambiguous political world,
voters use their existing store of knowledge to make inferences about candidates.’’
The results reported here indicate that the political world becomes considerably
more ‘‘ambiguous’’ when a voter distrusts news media messages. Like those in other
low information situations, voters who lack conﬁdence in the media are forced to
rely on ‘‘existing store[s] of knowledge,’’ especially their ‘‘standing decision’’ (Key
and Munger 1970, p. 253) among the parties. As Rahn (1993) states, ‘‘In partisan
elections, the most powerful cue provided by the political environment is the
candidate’s membership in a political party.’’ When a voter distrusts the press,
voting based on party identiﬁcation becomes the most instrumental choice.
This suggests that a broader range of phenomena could fall under the label of
media effects. Traditionally, media effects research has focused on the power of
media messages to persuade the public. Now, the growing body of work on source
credibility and the news media suggests that political behavior depends not just on
the volume and content of media messages, but also on attitudes toward the press
itself. Even holding messages constant, changes in the news media’s institutional
reputation can produce important effects on beliefs, opinions and voting
preferences. Given the dramatic changes in the American public’s views on the
media in the last several decades, these indirect media effects are likely to be
increasingly important.
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Appendix
Variables from GSS 1972–2008 Cumulative File
Conﬁdence in the Press—conpress; Conﬁdence in Major Companies—conbus;
Conﬁdence in Organized Religion—conclerg; Conﬁdence in Education—coneduc;
Conﬁdence in the Executive Branch of the Federal Government—confed; Conﬁ-
dence in Organized Labor—conlabor; Conﬁdence in Medicine—conmedic; Con-
ﬁdence in the U.S. Supreme Court—conjudge; Conﬁdence in the Scientiﬁc
Community—consci; Conﬁdence in Congress—conlegis; Conﬁdence in the Mili-
tary—conarmy.
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123Variables from ANES 2000–2004 Panel Study
Vote Choice—P045003a; News Media Thermometer—P025073, P045041; Political
Knowledge—P023155, P045202; Age—P023126x, P045193; Party Identiﬁcation—
P023038x, P045058x; Frequency of Following Government and Public Affairs—
P025084, P045057; Frequency of Political Discussion—P025004, P045002;
Campaign Television Viewing—P025002, P045001; Trust in Government—
P025174, P045149; Trust in People—P025101, P045158; Internal Efﬁcacy—
P025173, P045148; External Efﬁcacy—P025172, P045147; Preferences on Gov-
ernment Aid to the Poor—P025115x, P025115y, P045075x; Feminists Thermometer
Rating—P025071, P045039; Blacks Thermometer Rating—P025055, P045023;
Defense Spending Preferences—P025114x, P045081; Ideological Self-Placement—
P023024; Network News Exposure—P023002; Newspaper Exposure—P023004.
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